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The first major financial crisis of the twenty-
first  century  involves  esoteric  instruments, 
unaware  regulators,  and  skittish  investors.  It 
also follows a well-trodden path laid down by 
  centuries of financial folly. Is the “special” prob-
lem of sub-prime mortgages really different?
Our  examination  of  the  longer  historical 
record, which is part of a larger effort on cur-
rency and debt crises, finds stunning qualitative 
and  quantitative  parallels  across  a  number  of 
standard financial crisis indicators. To name a 
few, the run-up in US equity and housing prices 
that Graciela L. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
find to be the best leading indicators of crisis 
in countries experiencing large capital inflows 
closely  tracks  the  average  of  the  previous  18 
post–World War II banking crises in industrial 
countries.  So,  too,  does  the  inverted  v-shape 
of real growth in the years prior to the crisis. 
Despite widespread concern about the effects on 
national debt of the tax cuts of the early 2000s, 
the run-up in US public debt is actually some-
what below the average of other crisis episodes. 
In contrast, the pattern of US current account 
deficits is markedly worse.
At this juncture, the book is still open on how 
the current dislocations in the United States will 
play out. The precedent found in the aftermath 
of other episodes suggests that the strains can be 
quite severe, depending especially on the initial 
degree of trauma to the financial system (and to 
some extent, the policy response). The average 
drop in (real per capita) output growth is over 
2 percent, and it typically takes two years to 
return to trend. For the five most catastrophic 
cases (which include episodes in Finland, Japan, 
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Norway, Spain, and Sweden), the drop in annual 
output growth from peak to trough is over 5 per-
cent, and growth remained well below pre-crisis 
trend even after three years. These more cata-
strophic cases, of course, mark the boundary 
that policymakers particularly want to avoid.
I.  Postwar Bank-Centered Financial Crises:  
The Data
Our comparisons employ a small piece of a 
much  larger  and  longer  historical  dataset  we 
have  constructed  (see  Reinhart  and  Rogoff 
2008.) The extended dataset catalogues bank-
ing and financial crises around the entire world 
dating back to 1800 (in some cases earlier). In 
order to focus here on data most relevant to the 
present  US  situation,  we  do  not  consider  the 
plethora of emerging market crises, nor indus-
trialized country financial crises from the Great 
Depression or the 1800s. Nevertheless, even in 
the  smaller  sample  considered  in  this  paper, 
the “this time is different” syndrome has been 
repeated many times.
First come rationalizations. This time, many 
analysts argued, the huge run-up in US housing 
prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justified 
by  financial  innovation  (including  sub-prime 
mortgages), as well as by the steady inflow of 
capital  from  Asia  and  petroleum  exporters. 
The huge run-up in equity prices was similarly 
argued to be sustainable thanks to a surge in 
US productivity growth and a fall in risk that 
accompanied the “Great Moderation” in mac-
roeconomic volatility. As for the extraordinary 
string of outsized US current account deficits, 
which  at  their  peak  accounted  for  more  than 
two-thirds  of  all  the  world’s  current  account 
surpluses, many analysts argued that these, too, 
could be justified by new elements of the global 
economy. Thanks to a combination of a flexible 
economy and the innovation of the technology 
boom, the United States could be expected to 
enjoy superior productivity growth for decades, 
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while  superior  American  know-how  meant 
higher returns on physical and financial invest-
ment than foreigners could expect in the United 
States.
Next comes reality. Starting in the summer of 
2007, the United States experienced a striking 
contraction in wealth, increase in risk spreads, 
and deterioration in credit market functioning. 
The  2007  United  States  sub-prime  crisis,  of 
course, has it roots in falling US housing prices, 
which have in turn led to higher default levels, 
particularly  among  less  creditworthy  borrow-
ers. The impact of these defaults on the finan-
cial sector has been greatly magnified due to 
the complex bundling of obligations that was 
thought to spread risk efficiently. Unfortunately, 
that innovation also made the resulting instru-
ments extremely nontransparent and illiquid in 
the face of falling house prices.
As a benchmark for the 2007 US sub-prime 
crisis, we draw on data from the 18 bank-cen-
tered financial crises from the postwar period, 
as identified by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
and Gerard Caprio et. al. (2005). These crisis 
episodes include:
The  “Big  Five”  Crises:  Spain  (1977), 
Norway  (1987),  Finland  (1991),  Sweden 
(1991), and Japan (1992), where the start-
ing year is in parentheses.
Other  Banking  and  Financial  Crises: 
Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark 
(1987),  France  (1994),  Germany  (1977), 
Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), Italy (1990), 
New  Zealand  (1987),  United  Kingdom 
(1974,  1991,  1995),  and  United  States 
(1984).
The Big Five crises are all protracted, large-
scale financial crises that are associated with 
major declines in economic performance for an 
extended period. Japan (1992), of course, is the 
start of the “lost decade,” although all the others   
left deep marks as well.
The remaining rich country financial crises 
represent  a  broad  range  of  lesser  events.  The 
1984 US crisis, for example, is the savings and 
loan crisis. In terms of fiscal costs (3.2 percent 
of GDP), it is just a notch below the Big Five.
 1 
1 The fiscal costs of cleaning up after banking crises 
can be enormous. The fiscal cleanup from Sweden’s 1991 
Some of the other 13 crises are relatively minor 
affairs, such as the 1995 Barings (investment) 
bank crisis in the United Kingdom or the 1994 
Credit Lyonnaise bailout in France. Excluding 
these smaller crises would certainly not weaken 
our  results,  as  the  imbalances  in  the  run-sup 
were minor compared to the larger blowouts.
II.  Comparisons
We now proceed to a variety of simple com-
parisons between the 2007 US crisis and previ-
ous episodes. Drawing on the standard literature 
on financial crises, we look at asset prices, real 
economic growth, and public debt. We begin in 
Figure 1 by comparing the run-up in housing 
prices. Period T represents the year of the onset 
of the financial crisis. By that convention, period 
T 2 4 is four years prior to the crisis, and the 
graph in each case continues to T 1 3, except of 
course in the case of the US 2007 crisis, which 
remains in the hands of the fates.
2 The chart 
confirms the case study literature, showing the 
significant run-up in housing prices prior to a 
financial crisis. Notably, the run-up in housing 
prices in the United States exceeds that of the 
Big Five.
Figure 2 looks at real rates of growth in equity 
market  price  indices.  (For  the  United  States, 
the index is the S&P 500; Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008) provide the complete listing for foreign 
markets.)
Once again, the United States looks like the 
archetypical crisis country, only more so. The 
Big Five crisis countries tended to experience 
equity  price  falls  earlier  on  than  the  United 
States  has,  perhaps  because  the  US  Federal 
Reserve  pumped  in  an  extraordinary  amount 
of stimulus in the early part of the most recent 
episode.
Figure  3  looks  at  the  current  account  as  a 
share of GDP. Again, the United States is on 
a typical trajectory, with capital inflows accel-
  crisis was 6 percent of GDP and Norway’s 1987 crisis was 
8 percent. Spain’s post-1977 cleanup cost over 16 percent of 
GDP. Estimates for Japan’s bill vary widely, with many in 
excess of 20 percent of GDP.
2 For the United States, house prices are measured by 
the Case-Shiller index, described and provided in Robert 
Shiller (2005). The remaining house price data were made 
available by the Bank for International Settlements and are 
described in Gregory D. Sutton (2002). VOL. 98 NO. 2 341 IS ThE US SUB-PRIME CRISIS DIFFERENT?
erating up to the eve of the crisis. Indeed, the 
US deficits are more severe, reaching over six 
percent of GDP. As already mentioned, there is 
a large and growing literature that attempts to 
rationalize why the United States might be able 
to run a large sustained current account deficit 
without great risk of trauma. Whether the US 
case is quite as different as this literature sug-
gests remains to be seen.
Real per capita GDP growth in the run-up to 
debt crises is illustrated in Figure 4. The United 
States 2007 crisis follows the same inverted V 
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shape  that  characterizes  the  earlier  episodes. 
Growth momentum falls going into the typical 
crisis, and remains low for two years after. In 
the more severe Big Five cases, however, the 
growth shock is considerably larger and more 
prolonged than for the average. Of course, this 
implies that the growth effects are quite a bit 
less severe in the mildest cases, although the 
US case has so many markers of larger prob-
lems that one cannot take too much comfort in 
this caveat.
Figure 5 looks at public debt as a share of 
GDP.  Rising  public  debt  is  a  near  universal 
precursor of other postwar crises, not least the 
1984 US crisis. It is notable that US public debt 
rises much more slowly than it did in the run-up 
to the Big Five crises. However, if one were to 
incorporate the huge buildup in private US debt 
into these measures, the comparisons would be 
notably less favorable.
The correlations in these graphs are not nec-
essarily  causal,  but  in  combination  neverthe-
less suggest that if the United States does not 
experience a significant and protracted growth 
slowdown, it should either be considered very 
lucky or even more “special” that most optimis-
tic theories suggest. Indeed, given the severity 
of most crisis indicators in the run-up to its 2007 
financial crisis, the United States should con-
sider itself quite fortunate if its downturn ends 
up being a relatively short and mild one.
III.  Conclusions
Tolstoy famously begins his classic novel Anna 
Karenina with, “Every happy family is alike, but 
every unhappy family is unhappy in their own 
way.” While each financial crisis no doubt is dis-
tinct, they also share striking similarities in the 
run-up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in 
growth patterns, and in current account deficits. 
The majority of historical crises are preceded 
by  financial  liberalization,  as  documented  in 
Kaminsky  and  Reinhart  (1999).  While  in  the 
case  of  the  United  States,  there  has  been  no 
striking  de  jure  liberalization,  there  certainly 
has been a de facto liberalization. New unregu-
lated, or lightly regulated, financial entities have 
come to play a much larger role in the financial 
system, undoubtedly enhancing stability against 
some kinds of shocks, but possibly increasing 
vulnerabilities  against  others.  Technological 
progress has plowed ahead, shaving the cost of 
transacting in financial markets and broadening 
the menu of instruments.
Perhaps the United States will prove a differ-
ent kind of happy family. Despite many superfi-
cial similarities to a typical crisis country, it may 
yet suffer a growth lapse comparable only to the 
mildest cases. Perhaps this time will be different 
as so many argue. Nevertheless, the quantitative 
and  qualitative  parallels  in  run-ups  to  earlier 
postwar industrialized-country financial crises 
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are worthy of note. Of course, inflation is lower 
and better anchored today worldwide, and this 
may prove an important mitigating factor. The 
United States does not suffer the handicap of a 
fixed exchange rate system. On the other hand, 
the apparent decline in US productivity growth 
and in housing prices does not provide a par-
ticularly favorable backdrop for withstanding a 
credit contraction.
Another  parallel  deserves  mention.  During 
the 1970s, the US banking system stood as an 
intermediary  between  oil-exporter  surpluses 
and  emerging-market  borrowers  in  Latin 
America and elsewhere. While much praised at 
the time, 1970s petro-dollar recycling ultimately 
led to the 1980s debt crisis, which in turn placed 
enormous strain on money center banks.
3 It is 
3 See Rudi Dornbusch’s concise assessment of the recy-
cling of petrodollars in the third and fourth chapters of 
Dornbusch (1986).
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true that, this time, a large volume of petro-
  dollars are again flowing into the United States, 
but many emerging markets have been running 
current account surpluses, lending rather than 
borrowing.  Instead,  a  large  chunk  of  money 
has effectively been recycled to a developing 
economy that exists within US borders. Over 
a trillion dollars was channeled into the sub-
prime mortgage market, which is comprised of 
the  poorest  and  least  creditworthy  borrowers 
within the United States. The final claimant is 
different, but in many ways, the mechanism is 
the same.
Finally, we note that although this paper has 
concentrated  on  the  United  States,  many  of 
the same parallels hold for other countries that 
began  experiencing  housing  price  duress  dur-
ing 2007, including Spain, the United Kingdom, 
and  Ireland.  There  can  be  similarities  across 
unhappy families, too.
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